

# Online Appendix to “Seeing Spots: Partisanship, Negativity and the Conditional Receipt of Campaign Advertisements”

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## Online Appendix

### A Selected Ads: 2012 Presidential Campaign

Ad Title	Tone	Sponsor	N	Focus	Main Issue
"Briefcase"	Negative	Priorities U.S.A. Action	90	Policy	Bankrupting Companies at Bain
"Come and Go"	Negative	Obama for America	81	Policy	Outsourcing Jobs
"Makes You Wonder"	Negative	Obama for America	104	Character	Romney's Use of Tax Shelters
"Where Did All The Money Go?"	Negative	Romney for President	113	Policy	Stimulus Waste and Corruption
"It's OK"	Negative	Republican National Committee	86	Policy	Federal Deficit and Job Growth
"America Deserves Better"	Negative	Romney for President	97	Character	Politicizing Family Tragedy
"Succeed"	Positive	Obama for America	88	Policy	Saving Jobs and the Auto Industry
"I Believe"	Positive	Obama for America	82	Policy	Jobs and the Economy
"Higher Education"	Positive	Obama for America	78	Character	Education and Background
"Conservative Record"	Positive	Romney for President	67	Policy	Conservative Tax and Spend Record
"The Romney Plan"	Positive	Romney for President	87	Policy	Trade Policy and Middle Class Jobs
"Strong Leadership"	Positive	Romney for President	115	Character	Jobs Plan and Leadership Ability

Table I: Details for the campaign advertisements used in the National study.

### B Presentation of Experimental Stimuli




Figure I: **Interface:** Here is an example of the way in which the video screen was presented to respondents.

## C Guidance from Leading Scholars

To clarify ambiguity in prior research on reception, we surveyed leading experts in the field to gauge their baseline expectations about voter ad consumption. Scholars were selected for inclusion in our sample frame by having published significant research on elections, campaigns and advertising. We invited 135 experts to participate in an online straw poll, yielding a 46% response rate, and asked for their judgments about how ad tone and party source would impact skipping ads. We also ask them to predict rates of four ad-seeking or avoidance behaviors for each tone and source combination (i.e., out-party & positive, out-party & negative).

Figures II and III show that scholars expect ad-seeking and avoidance behaviors to depend on both information tone and source. Among the 62 scholars surveyed, 57% expect rates of skipping to be higher for positive ads, while 15% expect rates to be higher for negative ads and 29% thought there will be no difference. These aggregate expectations appear generally consistent with research suggesting negativity is better able to tap voter attention or interest. Turning to partisan sources, 71% of experts believe ads from the opposing party will elicit more skipping, while 16% expect voters will skip more ads aired by their own party, with 13% stating no difference. Scholarly expectations disagree with the ‘balanced diet’ view, and see partisanship playing an important role in information selectivity.

We finally look at expert predictions about ad-seeking for each tone and party interaction, across each of the four behaviors in our experiment: skipping ads, replaying them, requesting a link to share, and getting the actual ad link. We also combine these into an overall summary measure. (Results displayed in Figure III in the Online Appendix.) Consistent across all behaviors, experts (in the aggregate) believe negative and in-party ads will be more sought out (or less avoided) than positive and out-party ones. Quite interestingly, these behaviors are seen as additive. Overall, expert beliefs tell us three important things: 1) scholars expect negative ads to elicit greater self-exposure

than positive ads; 2) they expect more ad-seeking behavior from respondents presented with in-party ads; and 3) while they expect both tone and source to influence behavior, they expect the impact of party source to be more pronounced. In the next section, we describe the experimental design we use to adjudicate between these baseline beliefs, and the more mixed findings drawn from broader empirical research on voter selectivity.





Figure II: **Expert Predictions for Ad Seeking Behavior, Tone and Source Separate:** The barplots show the responses of leading elections and campaign scholars to a survey soliciting their expectations about ad seeking behaviors measured in this study. Experts were asked how (a) *ad tone* and (b) *party source* could impact skipping.

We note how close scholars in our poll came to predicting rates for each behavior we measured. Pooled together, experts predicted that approximately 40 percent of respon-



**Figure III: Expert Predictions for Ad Seeking Behavior, Tone and Source Combined:** This figure shows the responses of leading elections scholars to a survey soliciting their expectations about ad-seeking behaviors measured in this study. Experts were asked to predict rates of four ad-seeking (or avoidance) behaviors for each *ad tone* and *party source* combination.

dents would skip the ad, that 19 percent would replay it, 20 percent would want to share it, and 16 percent would request a link to similar ads. It is striking that these average predictions tend to be roughly on the mark as compared to our experimental findings, especially given the dearth of prior empirical evidence. We believe this speaks to the particular wisdom of *this* crowd.

## D OLS Models of Ad-Seeking Behavior: 2012 Presidential Study

### D.1 General OLS Model

Table II: Individual-Level Analysis of Ad-Seeking Behaviors: 2012 Presidential Sample

	ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES				
	Not Skip	Replay	Share	Get Link	$H_0: \beta_t = 0$
Source	0.032 (0.015)*	0.004 (0.009)	0.017 (0.008)*	0.006 (0.012)	0.054
Tone	0.002 (0.042)	-0.009 (0.024)	0.006 (0.023)	0.001 (0.035)	0.995
Source $\times$ PID	0.053 (0.016)**	0.025 (0.009)**	0.075 (0.009)***	0.078 (0.013)***	0.000
Source $\times$ Tone	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.023 (0.009)**	-0.002 (0.008)	0.005 (0.012)	0.133
Tone $\times$ PID	0.016 (0.016)	-0.016 (0.010) <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.346
Source $\times$ Tone $\times$ PID	0.019 (0.016)	0.003 (0.009)	0.012 (0.009)	0.021 (0.013)	0.200
News Interest	0.044 (0.020)*	0.009 (0.011)	0.022 (0.010)*	0.038 (0.016)*	0.003
News Interest $\times$ Tone	-0.008 (0.017)	0.003 (0.010)	0.001 (0.009)	0.002 (0.014)	0.981
Strength of PID	0.005 (0.015)	0.005 (0.009)	0.013 (0.008) <sup>+</sup>	-0.007 (0.012)	0.476
Registered to Vote	-0.061 (0.069)	0.006 (0.040)	0.016 (0.037)	-0.041 (0.057)	0.827
Undecided	-0.119 (0.062) <sup>+</sup>	0.026 (0.036)	-0.037 (0.034)	-0.029 (0.051)	0.225
Battleground	-0.053 (0.033)	-0.046 (0.019)*	-0.031 (0.018) <sup>+</sup>	0.002 (0.027)	0.020
Absolute Ideology	-0.016 (0.023)	0.001 (0.013)	0.014 (0.012)	0.000 (0.019)	0.746
Observations	1056	1064	1065	1066	—
R <sup>2</sup>	0.047	0.033	0.093	0.048	—

Models are OLS with additional controls for *Female*, *Black*, *Education*, *Income*, *Married*, *Unemployed*, *Vote Participation*, and *Church Attendance*. Standard errors are in parentheses. The final column presents  $p$ -values for a joint hypothesis test that the coefficients are zero across all models.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$ .

## D.2 General Logit Model

Table III: Individual-Level Analysis of Ad-Seeking Behaviors: 2012 Presidential Sample

	LOGIT LINEAR REGRESSION				
	Not Skip	Replay	Share	Get Link	H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_t = 0$
Source	0.136 (0.064)*	0.088 (0.116)	0.456 (0.208)*	0.001 (0.078)	–
Tone	0.039 (0.200)	-0.194 (0.362)	0.233 (0.545)	-0.161 (0.267)	–
Source × PID	0.224 (0.069)**	0.303 (0.124)*	1.322 (0.217)***	0.473 (0.085)***	–
Source × Tone	-0.017 (0.064)	-0.256 (0.116)*	0.010 (0.207)	0.038 (0.078)	–
Tone × PID	0.067 (0.070)	-0.135 (0.126)	-0.070 (0.216)	-0.058 (0.086)	–
Source × Tone × PID	0.079 (0.069)	0.021 (0.124)	0.187 (0.214)	0.122 (0.085)	–
News Interest	0.178 (0.082)*	0.122 (0.146)	0.389 (0.189)*	0.259 (0.108)*	–
News Interest × Tone	-0.038 (0.071)	0.054 (0.126)	-0.041 (0.171)	0.028 (0.094)	–
Strength of PID	0.020 (0.064)	0.051 (0.112)	0.120 (0.130)	-0.056 (0.076)	–
Registered to Vote	-0.266 (0.291)	0.093 (0.498)	0.521 (0.708)	-0.274 (0.366)	–
Undecided	-0.496 (0.262) <sup>+</sup>	0.340 (0.421)	-0.769 (0.762)	-0.142 (0.335)	–
Battleground	-0.213 (0.137)	-0.644 (0.266)*	-0.516 (0.280) <sup>+</sup>	0.013 (0.166)	–
Absolute Ideology	-0.069 (0.096)	0.020 (0.163)	0.214 (0.177)	-0.013 (0.115)	–
Observations	1056	1064	1065	1066	–
R <sup>2</sup>	–	–	–	–	–

Models are Logit with additional controls for *Female*, *Black*, *Education*, *Income*, *Married*, *Unemployed*, *Vote Participation*, and *Church Attendance*. Standard errors are in parentheses. The final column presents  $p$ -values for a joint hypothesis test that the coefficients are zero across all models.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$ .

### D.3 OLS Model, With Controls for Interesting Ads and Interaction By Tone

Table IV: Ad-Seeking Behaviors Controlling for the Proportion of Subjects Finding Ads to Be Interesting: 2012 Presidential Sample

	ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES				
	Not Skip	Replay	Share	Get Link	$H_0: \beta_t = 0$
Source	0.029 (0.016) <sup>+</sup>	0.005 (0.009)	0.019 (0.008)*	0.006 (0.013)	0.048
Tone	-0.182 (0.143)	-0.041 (0.083)	0.134 (0.075) <sup>+</sup>	0.029 (0.117)	0.279
Source $\times$ PID	0.053 (0.016)**	0.026 (0.009)**	0.075 (0.009)***	0.078 (0.013)***	0.000
Source $\times$ Tone	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.022 (0.009)*	0.000 (0.008)	0.005 (0.032)	0.158
Tone $\times$ PID	0.016 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.014)	0.389
Source $\times$ Tone $\times$ PID	0.017 (0.016)	0.003 (0.010)	0.012 (0.009)	0.021 (0.014)	0.228
Interesting Ad	0.108 (0.407)	-0.295 (0.234)	-0.172 (0.212)	-0.098 (0.332)	0.655
Interesting Ad $\times$ Tone	0.542 (0.406)	0.144 (0.234)	-0.363 (0.212) <sup>+</sup>	-0.036 (0.332)	0.228
Observations	1056	1064	1065	1066	–
R <sup>2</sup>	0.046	0.036	0.094	0.046	–

Models are OLS with full additional controls. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Interesting Ad* is an ad-level measure aggregating individual responses to the multiple-option question: “From what you saw of the clip, how would you describe the video? (Please select all that apply)”, with one of the options being “Interesting”. The final column presents  $p$ -values for a joint hypothesis test that the coefficients are zero across all models.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$ .



## D.4 OLS Model, With Controls for Previously Seen Ads and Interaction By Tone

Table V: Ad-Seeking Behaviors Controlling for the Proportion of Subjects Reporting to Have Previously Seen the Ads: 2012 Presidential Sample

	ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES				
	Not Skip	Replay	Share	Get Link	$H_0: \beta_t = 0$
Source	0.008 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.011 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.016)	0.658
Tone	-0.076 (0.080)	0.041 (0.046)	-0.006 (0.042)	0.060 (0.065)	0.636
Source $\times$ PID	0.053 (0.016)**	0.025 (0.009)**	0.075 (0.009)***	0.077 (0.013)***	0.000
Source $\times$ Tone	0.013 (0.019)	-0.027 (0.011)*	0.001 (0.010)	0.004 (0.016)	0.162
Tone $\times$ PID	0.016 (0.016)	-0.016 (0.009) <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.337
Source $\times$ Tone $\times$ PID	0.018 (0.016)	0.003 (0.009)	0.012 (0.009)	0.021 (0.013)	0.236
Seen Ad	-0.310 (0.182) <sup>+</sup>	-0.148 (0.104)	-0.078 (0.096)	-0.336 (0.149)*	0.031
Seen Ad $\times$ Tone	0.186 (0.182)	-0.100 (0.104)	0.033 (0.095)	-0.105 (0.149)	0.630
Observations	1056	1064	1065	1066	–
R <sup>2</sup>	0.049	0.034	0.092	0.050	–

Models are OLS with full additional controls. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Seen Ad* is an ad-level measure aggregating individual responses to the question: “From what you saw of the clip, do you think you have seen it before?” The final column presents  $p$ -values for a joint hypothesis test that the coefficients are zero across all models.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$ .

## D.5 OLS Model, Stratifying on Skipping and Non-Skipping Participants

Table VI: Individual-Level Analysis of Ad-Seeking Behaviors: 2012 Presidential Sample, Stratifying on Skippers

	ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES				
	Not Skip	Replay	Share	Get Link	$H_0: \beta_t = 0$
Source	–	0.017 (0.012)	0.006 (0.009)	0.003 (0.015)	0.450
Tone	–	-0.011 (0.030)	0.011 (0.022)	0.008 (0.037)	0.343
Source $\times$ PID	–	0.013 (0.124)	0.045 (0.009)***	0.019 (0.016)	0.000
Source $\times$ Tone	–	-0.006 (0.012)	0.003 (0.009)	0.006 (0.015)	0.894
Tone $\times$ PID	–	-0.017 (0.013)	0.004 (0.009)	0.025 (0.016)	0.203
Source $\times$ Tone $\times$ PID	–	0.007 (0.013)	0.029 (0.009)**	0.003 (0.016)	0.017
News Interest	–	0.016 (0.014)	0.011 (0.010)	0.037 (0.017)*	0.064
News Interest $\times$ Tone	–	0.003 (0.012)	0.003 (0.009)	0.028 (0.094)	0.981
Strength of PID	–	-0.002 (0.012)	0.007 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.860
Registered to Vote	–	0.048 (0.052)	0.009 (0.038)	-0.014 (0.063)	0.802
Undecided	–	0.002 (0.044)	-0.008 (0.032)	0.010 (0.054)	0.992
Battleground	–	-0.034 (0.025)	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.030)	0.209
Absolute Ideology	–	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.022)	0.661
Observations	–	459	459	459	–
R <sup>2</sup>	–	–	–	–	–

Models are OLS with additional controls for *Female*, *Black*, *Education*, *Income*, *Married*, *Unemployed*, *Vote Participation*, and *Church Attendance*. Standard errors are in parentheses. The final column presents  $p$ -values for a joint hypothesis test that the coefficients are zero across all models.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$ .

Table VII: Individual-Level Analysis of Ad-Seeking Behaviors: 2012 Presidential Sample, Stratifying on Non-Skippers

	ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES				
	Not Skip	Replay	Share	Get Link	H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_t = 0$
Source	–	-0.005 (0.013)	0.024 (0.013)	0.002 (0.019)	0.298
Tone	–	-0.009 (0.039)	0.016 (0.039)	-0.007 (0.057)	0.971
Source × PID	–	0.032 (0.014)*	0.083 (0.014)***	0.104 (0.020)***	0.000
Source × Tone	–	-0.036 (0.013)**	-0.003 (0.013)	0.005 (0.019)	0.049
Tone × PID	–	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.046 (0.021)*	0.148
Source × Tone × PID	–	0.001 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.014)	0.036 (0.020) <sup>+</sup>	0.345
News Interest	–	-0.002 (0.018)	0.024 (0.018)	0.026 (0.026)	0.419
News Interest × Tone	–	0.005 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.015)	0.007 (0.022)	0.952
Strength of PID	–	0.009 (0.013)	0.017 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.019)	0.393
Registered to Vote	–	-0.039 (0.061)	0.031 (0.060)	-0.045 (0.089)	0.815
Undecided	–	0.052 (0.058)	-0.047 (0.059)	0.002 (0.085)	0.698
Battleground	–	-0.055 (0.028)	-0.027 (0.028)	0.034 (0.041)	0.178
Absolute Ideology	–	0.018 (0.019)	0.020 (0.019)	0.017 (0.028)	0.507
Observations	–	592	593	594	–
R <sup>2</sup>	–	–	–	–	–

Models are OLS with additional controls for *Female*, *Black*, *Education*, *Income*, *Married*, *Unemployed*, *Vote Participation*, and *Church Attendance*. Standard errors are in parentheses. The final column presents *p*-values for a joint hypothesis test that the coefficients are zero across all models.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$ .

## E Additional Figures

### E.1 Independents

Results in Figure V highlight one subset for which a small tone effect may peek through – pure independents. On our summary measure of ad seeking, we see a slight preference for negative ads over positive ones among these respondents. This effect is not statistically significant for any of the individual component behaviors. Yet, this summary evidence aligns with other work on ad tone, especially ? who find the strongest demobilization effects among independent identifiers. Perhaps it is not surprising that this modest tone effect is among the group least subject to partisan source bias. Indeed, Figure V also highlights that Independents, at most, have a slight (and not statistically significant) preference for consuming Republican-aired ads.

Despite heterogeneity across our analysis, we find a clear overall effect of an ad’s partisan source on ad seeking behaviors. This is true among both Democrats and Republicans in both studies. This source effect is also relatively weak among pure Independent, consistent with their unaligned partisan status. Revisiting the expectations of scholars in our straw poll given our experimental results, we find that they were 1) remarkably accurate in their average predictions, 2) correct in expecting source to matter when interacted with respondent PID, 3) right to expect that the partisan effect would be larger than the tone effect, but 4) that they substantially *overestimated* the impact of tone.




Figure IV: **Density of Time Viewed by PID:** These figures display density plots for the amount of time viewed by PID. Leaners are included as partisans.  $P$ -values are based on two-sample  $t$ -tests.




Figure V: **Summary Measure of Ad Seeking by PID, with Independents:** This figure shows an additive summary measure for the rates at which subjects pursued the various behaviors associated with ad exposure propensity by respondent PID and ad tone/source. This measure is simply an additive scale of all four behaviors we observed.




Figure VI: **Ad Seeking by PID, Source and Tone (Presidential):** These plots show the rates at which subjects pursued the various behaviors associated with ad exposure propensity by tone, ad source and respondent PID. Leaners are included as partisans.

## F 2013 Virginia Gubernatorial Study

To ensure that our results were not unique to the quadrennial presidential election, we also fielded a similar study through YouGov on a sample ( $N = 1200$ ) of Virginians in the days prior to that Commonwealth's 2013 gubernatorial election. We present results from that study, which largely corroborate the findings in our national sample, here.

The design for the Virginia Study was identical, except that each respondent was shown two ads in sequence, for a total of 60 seconds. The 12 ads were chosen, using the same criteria as our presidential ads, from Republican Ken Cuccinelli and Democrat Terry McAuliffe. The random assignment was such that both of the ads shown to a respondent (with no pause between the ads) were from the same campaign and of the same tone. By extending the total viewing time to 60 seconds rather than 30, we can assess skipping propensity over a longer duration, while still preserving the ability to examine how long respondents watch the first ad.

The median respondent in the Virginia study watched 24.9 seconds of the two combined 30-second ads, a bit less than the median for the presidential ads. Skipping rates were also higher in the Virginia study, with 55 percent of respondents skipping the first ad, and a full 80 percent skipping before the end of the second ad.

### F.1 Selected Ads



Ad Title	Tone	Sponsor	N <sub>1</sub>	N <sub>2</sub>	Focus	Main Issue
“Gifts”	Negative	McAuliffe for Governor	89	84	Character	Campaign Gifts Scandal
“Radical Plans”	Negative	McAuliffe for Governor	89	75	Policy	Radical Education Plans
“Witch”	Negative	McAuliffe for Governor	81	100	Character	UVA Investigation Scandal
“Unserious”	Negative	Cuccinelli for Governor	97	89	Character	Experience and Qualifications
“SEC Investigation”	Negative	Cuccinelli for Governor	102	92	Character	Under Investigation by SEC
“Despicable”	Negative	Cuccinelli for Governor	97	115	Policy	Jobs and Pensions Plan
“Focus”	Positive	McAuliffe for Governor	82	97	Policy	Job Growth and Economic Development
“Youngest of Four”	Positive	McAuliffe for Governor	93	94	Character	Background on Business and Family
“As Governor”	Positive	McAuliffe for Governor	107	91	Policy	Jobs and Education Plan
“Your Side”	Positive	Cuccinelli for Governor	88	85	Policy	Tax and Regulation of Small Business
“Opportunity”	Positive	Cuccinelli for Governor	86	103	Character	Background and Education Opportunity
“Deserve”	Positive	Cuccinelli for Governor	103	89	Policy	Education Plan

Table VIII: Details for the campaign advertisements used in the Virginia study.

## F.2 OLS Models of Ad-Seeking Behavior: 2013 Virginia Gubernatorial Study

### F.3 Virginia Figures




Figure VII: **Time Watched by Tone:** This figure displays density plots for the amount of time viewed by ad tone for the Virginia Gubernatorial sample. Leaners are included as partisans.  $P$ -values are based on two-sample  $t$ -tests.

We find that respondents watch the same amount of positive and negative ads on average ( $p = 0.181$ ) in the Virginia study. The  $ks$ -test ( $p = 0.001$ ) in this sample suggests

Table IX: Individual-Level Analysis of Ad-Seeking Behaviors: 2013 Virginia Gubernatorial Sample

	ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES				
	Not Skip <sub>60</sub>	Replay	Share	Get Link	H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_t = 0$
Source	0.007 (0.015)	0.012 (0.010)	0.008 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.012)	0.482
Tone	0.020 (0.048)	-0.012 (0.032)	-0.020 (0.022)	0.013 (0.040)	0.906
Source × PID	0.043 (0.016)**	0.027 (0.011)*	0.018 (0.007)*	0.010 (0.013)	0.000
Source × Tone	0.033 (0.015)*	0.001 (0.010)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.023 (0.012) <sup>+</sup>	0.040
Tone × PID	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.000 (0.007)	0.011 (0.013)	0.946
Source × Tone × PID	0.011 (0.016)	0.031 (0.011)**	0.009 (0.007)	0.007 (0.013)	0.030
News Interest	0.014 (0.021)	0.010 (0.014)	0.016 (0.009) <sup>+</sup>	0.055 (0.017)**	0.005
News Interest × Tone	-0.011 (0.018)	-0.000 (0.013)	0.011 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.015)	0.677
Strength of PID	0.014 (0.014)	0.017 (0.010) <sup>+</sup>	0.002 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.012)	0.430
Registered to Vote	-0.052 (0.068)	-0.074 (0.047)	-0.064 (0.032)*	0.046 (0.056)	0.148
Undecided	-0.015 (0.059)	-0.065 (0.040) <sup>+</sup>	0.002 (0.027)	-0.065 (0.048)	0.468
Battleground	-0.003 (0.032)	0.007 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.015)	0.028 (0.026)	0.920
Absolute Ideology	0.012 (0.022)	-0.028 (0.015) <sup>+</sup>	0.016 (0.010)	0.002 (0.018)	0.217
Observations	1164	1160	1159	1158	–
R <sup>2</sup>	0.021	0.042	0.041	0.032	–

Models are OLS with additional controls for *Female*, *Black*, *Education*, *Income*, *Married*, *Unemployed*, *Vote Participation*, and *Church Attendance*. Standard errors are in parentheses. The final column presents  $p$ -values for a joint hypothesis test that the coefficients are zero across all models.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$ .

negative tone may slightly increase watching behavior. We do find small differences in watching during the first few moments of Virginia ads, that vanish after 10 seconds.




Figure VIII: **Tone:** This figure shows rates of four ad seeking behaviors, and an overall summary measure, by tone of ad for the Virginia Gubernatorial sample.




Figure IX: **Ad Seeking by PID and Source:** This plot shows the rates at which subjects pursued the various behaviors associated with ad exposure propensity by ad source and respondent PID. Leaners are included as partisans.




Figure X: **Summary Measure of Ad Seeking by PID, with Independents:** This figure shows an additive summary measure for the rates at which subjects pursued the various behaviors associated with ad exposure propensity by respondent PID and ad tone/source. This measure is simply an additive scale of all four behaviors we observed.




Figure XI: **Density of Time Viewed by PID:** These figures display density plots for the amount of time viewed by PID for Virginia Gubernatorial sample. Learners are included as partisans.  $P$ -values are based on two-sample  $t$ -tests.




Figure XII: **Ad Seeking by PID, Source and Tone (Virginia Gubernatorial):** These plots show the rates at which subjects pursued the various behaviors associated with ad exposure propensity by tone, ad source and respondent PID. Leaners are included as partisans.