Quiz 3

Voter	Ideological Location	Party
A	1	D
B	1	D
C	2	D
D	4	D
E	6	D
F	6	R
G	7	R
H	8	R
I	9	R
J	10	R

Recall Question Four from the exam, but let's now consider a case without single-peaked preferences. Specifically, let's consider the case where one party, D, has an *open* primary, but the other party R has a *closed* primary. An open primary means anyone can vote in the primary election, whereas a closed primary means only party members can vote in the party primary.

1.

Supposed that there are two candidates running in the D primary, but only one candidate running in the R primary. The candidate R locates at 10. The candidate D1 locates at 5, and candidate D2 locates at 1.

Which candidate wins the *open* primary race between D1 and D2? Why? [Hint: Who wins between the R candidate, and the winner of the Democratic primary?]

2.

Assume again that the D primary is an *open* primary, and there are two candidates, D1 who locates at 1, and D2 who locates at the median location 6. If all voters vote for the candidate nearest them, who wins?

II

I	A	R
99	99,-1	0,0
50	50,50	0,0
0	-1,100	0,0

Recall again the divide the dollar game on the midterm, but now consider the above payoffs. That is I and II not have a -1 for getting 1 cent or less in the game.

3.

Given the above payoffs, what are the equilibrum or eqilibria, if any?

Sugars

Veggies	Pie	Cake	Salmon
Caviar	120, 4	150, 7	50, 2
Oysters	110, 7	160, 8	110, 1
Escargot	100, 8	140, 6	130, 4

Veggies is a restaurant offering the above menu to better appeal to its more upscale Berkeley clientele. Veggies is now offering Caviar, Oysters, and Escargot, with the resulting payoffs listed above. Sugars offers Pie, Cake, and Salmon on its menu with the above payoffs.

4.

Are there any equilibria? Which one(s)? [Note again that you should try first to eliminate dominated strategies first, and then see, what choices remain]